Until the 'Basel 2' reforms to banking supervision, operational risk was largely a residual category for risks and uncertainties which were difficult to quantify, insure and manage in traditional ways. This paper examines the rapid emergence of operational risk from this low epistemic status to its institutionalisation as a key component of global banking regulation. However, the meaning and implications of the Basel proposals have been fiercely contested by international banks and three key domains of policy controversy have been, and remain, particularly visible: definitional issues, data collection and the limits of quantification. Tensions in these three areas are discussed and reveal the significance of operational risk as a meeting point for diverse concerns and interests, and as a potential reinvention of a management knowledge hybrid between auditing and finance. The paper draws attention to the ironies and contradictions of this operational risk programme, which is part of a visionary project to extend 'enforced self-regulation' deep into the operations of banking, combining advanced technical modelling ideas on the one hand and softer corporate governance thinking on the other. The Basel 2 proposals demonstrate the policy effectiveness of 'operational risk' as an agenda-forming category for diverse communities of interest, and reinforces the relevance of a political economy of regulation which emphasizes knowledge production by multiple and competing organizational agents.
management and regulation of operational risk. 1 The process of developing, implementing and supervising operational risk management in banks is evolving and incomplete, and at the time of writing, the third consultation paper has been published (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003a). However, in many respects the most difficult and decisive step has already been taken: the rise and institutionalisation of 'operational risk' as a category of regulatory and managerial attention. It is relative easy for parties in different communities of interest to find a space of agreement about general objects abstracted from the messy realities of, and negotiations about, implementation. Categories such as 'operational risk' play this role in a regulatory visioning process, providing tentative maps for the reordering of practice and new languages and ideas for change agents at the organizational level.
To suggest that operational risk has been 'invented' is not merely figurative or fanciful. Of course, in some realist sense businesses in general and banks in particular have been aware for many years of hazards and uncertainties arising from defective information technology and infrastructure, from fraud, from business disruption, and from legal liability. However, the reconstructed visibility of these risks within the discourse of 'operational risk' re-positions their location and status for managerial and regulatory purposes. Furthermore, the Basel 2 programme makes connections between the management of operational risk and good corporate governance in such a way as to position these 'old' risks in a new space of regulatory, political and social expectations. With the invention of operational risk, discourses of good governance and risk management are increasingly intertwined and co-extensive.
The discursive power of the category of 'operational risk' is evident from its rapid emergence. Although the term 'operations risk' existed in 1991as a generic concept (COSO, 1991) , the category of 'operational risk' did not acquire widespread currency until the mid to late 1990s when the Basel 2 proposals were developed and published.
It is tempting to regard Nicholas Leeson, the 'rogue' trader attributed with the destruction of Barings bank in 1995, as the true author and unwitting inventor of 'operational risk', since most discussions of the topic refer to this case as a defining If 'operational risk' scarcely existed as a category of practitioner thinking in the early 1990s, by the end of the decade, banking regulators and practitioners could talk of little else. 3 Books were being published, conferences were being organised, and apparently new roles, such as 'operational risk manager', were being created; there was even talk of an 'operational risk' profession. Operational risk in the banking industry started life as a residual category, something left over from market and credit risk management practices, a fear category with a problematic reality and status. For this reason, it has proved problematic to define, although such difficulties in fixing meaning have enhanced, rather than detracted from, its importance. Operational risk is therefore no simple or self-evident category; it is a label for a diverse range of practices, a vision of control and regulation in an elusive field, and an imperative to manage a newly visible range of problems. It is both a name for a set of problems and interests, and a promise of a new way of intervening in the internal structure of financial organisations. The discussion that follows is neither intended to police any kind of preferred definition of 'operational risk' nor to engage in the operational risk debate at a normative technical level. Rather, the objective is to analyse attempts to fix the meaning of operational risk, to constitute forms of data-gathering practice, and to establish forms of economic calculation in its name. All three areas reveal tensions in the logic of operational risk, ie, between broad and narrow definitions, between routine and non-routine data and between hard and soft philosophies of quantification.
This essay is concerned with tracking their implications for an operational risk 'logic of practice' (Bourdieu, 1992) . The next section provides a descriptive overview of the Basel 2 proposals regarding operational risk and their significance for banking regulation. This is followed by three sections dealing respectively with the problem of defining operational risk, data collection and quantification. The final section provides a critical discussion of these tensions in the context of competitive pressures in the hierarchy of management knowledge.
BANKING REGULATION AND OPERATIONAL RISK
Banking regulation has evolved over the years in the shadow of crisis (eg, Moran, 1986 Moran, , 1989 . In 1974, a 'club' of central bankers, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, was formed to coordinate global policy body for banking supervision.
The committee has no national regulatory authority per se, but has de facto power via the implementation of its recommendations by national supervisory bodies. The committee is located within, and administered via, the Bank for International
Settlements and in 1988 it devised a system for regulating the adequacy of the capital base in banks.
This capital regulation process is part of the deep logic of prudential banking regulation which requires individual banks to maintain a buffer adequate to cover unexpected losses. Such a buffer, by acting to prevent banking failure at the individual bank level, simultaneously reduces 'systemic' risk, i.e., the risk that the failure of a single institution could create failures elsewhere in the system, because of the interconnectedness of transactions and institutions.
Capital adequacy regulation formalizes principles that are inherent in prudential banking. Such a process of 'regulatory induction' inherent in the design of the 1988
Basel accord ('Basel 1') is common in 'kick-starting' regulatory arrangements in order to command legitimacy and consent; de facto practices of ordering tend to drive conceptions of 'best' practice. However, the process of determining the specific level of capital for regulatory purposes is far from being merely a technical issue. The minimum ratio of capital to assets (capital adequacy) set originally at eight percent clearly reflected the interests of Anglo-American regulators and effectively disfavoured German banks (which typically operated with much higher rations) and Japanese banks (which were required to reduce assets to comply) (Underhill, 1991; Leyshon, 1994: 137) .
At the national level, the capital base for a specific bank was determined by a banking supervisor, usually but not always the central bank, and was calculated on the basis of disclosed balance sheet items weighted according to judgements about their underlying risks. Over time, banks began to complain about the calculative basis of the charge, arguing that it was arbitrary and did not discriminate sufficiently between the different risk profiles of specific banks, or between different risks within a single bank. Indeed, the 1988 Basel accord was not at all risk sensitive (Vieten, 1996) .
Banks who felt that their risk management processes were good believed that the regulation placed them at a competitive disadvantage by requiring too much capital to be maintained.
The Basel Committee, influenced by these views, began to develop a new strategy, recognising for the first time the calculation of regulatory capital based in part on the risk models and systems of the banks themselves. This increasing regulatory openness to forms of knowledge, particularly the global emergence of financial economics, at the industry level corresponded to a significant shift in apparent policy style, from a broadly command-and-control style of banking supervision to one more consistent with ideas of 'enforced self-regulation' (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) in which banks regulate capital according to their own models subject to regulatory oversight. Moral hazard, whereby individual banks are better placed than regulators to understand their exposures, could be ameliorated by nurturing self-interest in ensuring a capital reserve appropriate to risk exposures. This is now the broad underlying philosophy of Basel 2, a system which assumes that banks' risk appetites can be more or less aligned with those of regulators, and that therefore it is generally efficient to leave the detail of regulation to the banks themselves, subject to monitoring and backtesting.
The significant change occurred in 1996, when the Basel Committee rules were adapted to permit the use of in-house models for the purpose of reserving capital against market risk exposure. Bank modelling techniques were most advanced in the area of market risk, i.e., the risk to portfolios of assets arising from changes in underlying market variables, so this made good sense. In addition, it is in the nature of these models that their quality can be rigorously back-tested. Thus, in the case of market risk, models could almost entirely replace regulatory discretion (although they can be subject to an arbitrary regulatory 'multiplier'). This also signifies a shift in the political economy of banking regulation, whereby powerful actors participate as insiders in knowledge production rather than as lobbying outsiders. In turn, regulators establish consensus at the general level of principles and classification schemes, a strategy which shifts politics from the policy level to that of implementation.
Another important strand of regulatory thinking is distinct from the capital charge requirement ('Pillar 1') and relates to more general internal risk management and control practices ('Pillar 2'). This strand has always been considered to be important in the management and regulation of banks, although being less amenable to quantification has appeared more humble and less glamorous. The need for internal control systems has been a part of banking legislation since the 1980s (e.g., the UK Banking Act 1987, s 39) but over time, as the self-management of risk for banks has become more significant, supervisory systems and approaches have been re-designed to take account of a new accent on internal control (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1994; 1998a operational risk assessment and measurement is at its sharpest in this context. The second pillar concerns the adequacy of the control environment and systems, and the third concerns the nature and extent of bank disclosures about the process used to manage and control risk.
As far as the first pillar is concerned, where the measurement of operational risk capital is central, the regulatory approach adopted is evolutionary in vision. Banks are encouraged to develop their approaches to operational risk management along a oneway, increasingly risk-sensitive continuum from a basic to a standardised and ultimately to a sophisticated, 'advanced', internal measurement system. Once a bank qualifies to use a more sophisticated approach, it becomes mandatory for it to do so.
In order to encourage this evolutionary process, Basel 2 originally set 20 per cent of current minimum regulatory capital as an opening benchmark for the new operational risk (OR) capital charge, a ratio derived from observed practice. This was subsequently reduced to 12 per cent, and the original details of the standardised and advanced measurement approaches have been modified.
The process of developing these rules for measuring operational risk capital has been, and remains, subject to considerable industry negotiation, featuring 'road shows' and There can be no doubting the ambitious nature of the Basel 2 proposals with respect to operational risk. It is a category that stretches the logic of the capital cushion, a deep part of bank regulatory thinking, to its very limit. 8 In the next section, the first of three operational risk 'hotspots' is considered; the problem of defining operational risk itself. In subsequent sections, the controversies surrounding data collection and quantification will be addressed.
STRATEGIES OF DEFINITION
Definitions and related classification schemes matter not just in providing agreed meanings for practitioners; they also delimit potential jurisdictions in systems of professional knowledge (Abbott, 1988) , even functioning to constitute economic life in new ways (Tribe, 1978) . For example, from the mid 1990s onwards, relatively low status functionaries, such as internal auditors, began to have a voice in the name of operational risk that they could not have dreamed of in the 1980s. So, the project of defining operational risk is more than a simple matter of labelling; it involves work, often competitive work, to construct a concept in which different interests and ambitions can be represented.
In its early manifestations, operational risk was simply a residual category for 'other risks' not covered by market risk and credit risk. This marginal conceptual position belied the significance of its role in the architecture of risk management knowledge, a role made more visible with the re-diagnosis of large loss events as operational risk failures. These events simultaneously challenged the low epistemic status of this residual, and with it the related professional and regulatory order in the banking world. From the mid-1990s, various projects of positively defining and determining 'operational risk' became coextensive with establishing new boundaries of knowledge and practice within financial organisations. Although, these projects were fraught with a single serious difficulty, namely that operational risk is 'extremely hard to define' (Goodhart, 2001) , the ambiguity of operational risk in fact strengthened its key role as a 'boundary object':
'Boundary objects are those objects that both inhabit several communities of practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. Boundary objects are thus both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use and become strongly structured in individual site use' (Bowker and Star, 2000: 297) .
The plasticity of operational risk is evident in various definitional debates (See contrasted with the concept of variability of outcome around an expected mean familiar in financial economics and elsewhere (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002: 26) .
At the level of specifying an abstract boundary object for official purposes, definitional options for operational risk are strategically significant: as the definition becomes broader and encompasses more potential sources of loss, the management of operational risk must also be conceptualised beyond the ambit of any existing departmentally-based risk manager, potentially involving greater organizational change and 'lots of stepping on toes' (Jameson, 2001a (Power, 2000) reinforced by Basel 2.
Operational risk as a broadly defined boundary object provides opportunities for internal agents, such as lawyers and accountants, to redefine and reposition their work in terms of risk management. Accountants tend to argue that the concept of internal control is the starting point for thinking about operational risk management as an integrating function (Wilson, 2001) . From this point of view, the category of operational risk is not a functionally discrete area alongside market or credit risk; it has a higher order monitoring status. For example, stress testing market risk models is part of market risk management, but failure to stress test market risk models against extreme market movements (allegedly in the case of Long Term Capital Management)
is a form of operational risk. From the accountants' point of view, far from being a residual, operational risk management could be said to oversee the organisational environment of market and credit risk management. This accounting emphasis contrasts with the view of market risk specialists trained in financial economics, for whom operational risk is a messy, recalcitrant area in its infancy which may eventually be amenable to modelling. The definition of operational risk is therefore a stake in the micro-politics of professional mobilisation
To summarise: Definitions of key concepts are an intimate and central part of the logic of any practice; without a system of concepts and taxonomies, any practice of intervention is blind, disorganised and of questionable legitimacy. Definitions are attention-directing devices and strategies which determine objects of managerial and regulatory interest, boundary objects which are vague and ambivalent at the edges but which become determinate through the processes of intervention and control conceived in their name. In this sense definitions can 'kick-start' practices and to a large extent Basel 2, and its evolutionary philosophy, has been very successful in doing this. From this point of view the processes of defining operational risk have been a major regulatory and managerial innovation, creating the conceptual conditions of possibility for an emerging discipline, which is more than the sum of its established constituents. This definitional work is also undertaken by different organisational agents interested in constructing risk management in terms of their own concepts and protocols and related interpretations of risk phenomena. These organizationally specific contests over specific meanings and implementation matter considerably at the level of data collection.
RISK IDENTIFICATION AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF DATA

COLLECTION
As we saw above, the category of operational risk is significant not merely as an assembly point for existing risk management practices, but also as a category of attention and visibility for threats which were either ignored by banks, or made insufficiently explicit in their management systems. From this point of view, operation risk is part of a broader shift in awareness at the organization level about the importance of the completeness of risk identification for any risk management system, and of getting issues onto the agenda of management thinking. However, a crucial phase in the realization of management practice is the normalization of data collection in which 'dangers' become 'risks' capable of being located in the logic of managerial decision making (cf, Luhmann, 1992) . At this point, the definition of operational risk is materialized by specific data-gathering exercises.
The data collection debate is in essence a reformulation of the definitional discussion shows that certain risks may cross existing conceptual boundaries (Cagan, 2001 ), boundaries which correspond to different levels of management process.
Accordingly, definitions, responsibilities, concepts of error and of loss, and potential risk management jurisdictions are mutually constitutive. How operational risk relevant data is defined has implications for who is legitimised to act in its name.
The definition of an operational risk event is always an institutional rather than a natural fact. For example, the entire capital charging structure underpinning Basel 2 is weighted towards the recognition of concrete ex-post events, such as direct losses and write downs. Anticipatory and preventative investments in internal controls are valued in so far as they impact on the future loss experience of the bank. Although, Basel 2 seeks to nurture experimentation in the operational risk area, practitioners in the 1990s and early 2000s have been uneasy about this regulatory thinking, an unease compounded by the ambivalent relation between existing accounting systems, designed for actual and expected losses at best, and the potentially broader scope of operational risk relevant loss events, to include unexpected losses and 'near misses'.
Consequently, databases are argued to be 'shaky and fragile' (Goodhart, 2001) because of these definitional ambiguities about loss, and also because significant single event operational losses are rare.
Within a regulatory regime which is risk sensitive, the capital charge for operational risk should, in theory, reflect the experience and risk profile of an individual bank.
However, the Basel Committee in its early studies also admitted that the current state of knowledge and loss data was so poor that the internal measurement of operational risk was 'still in the dark'. Appropriate data is absent for all but a handful of banks, and industry standards for such data are still lacking (Cagan, 2001 and, except for a range of normal errors, e.g., transactions processing, firm-specific data is generally inadequate. In short, data for operational risk management is most needed where it is both thin and conceptually problematic, ie, for rare, high impact possibilities.
It is also unclear how any database for losses is coupled to the internal control environment, since serious operational risk events may not be linked to transactions in a clear way. In early discussions of Basel 2, banking practitioners have argued that it is problematic to use historical loss data for calculating economic capital, if controls are always improved in the light of loss experiences. In addition, it is not always clear that loss data is valuable, since it is often silent on causation. More critically, the probability measure component of the capital calculation is not a given based on frequency data, but can be influenced by management; probability in these settings is space for social action and is behavioural (Wynne, 2003) or performative (Mackenzie, 2002) in form, rather than technical.
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Demonstrable adherence to corporate governance standards under pillar 2, such as those prescribed in the UK by the Turnbull report (ICAEW, 1999) should lead, in theory, to an adjustment factor by the Basel 2 regulations, especially as good controls are a prerequisite for the use of advanced approaches. The Committee has been initially hesitant to develop explicit scores for internal controls because they may not be 'objective', arguing that good internal control translates into lower loss experience in later years. In this way, although banks have historically been required to have higher minimum capital where controls are judged to be weak, banks with good controls are likely to get credit ex-post only via lower loss experiences and by being permitted to use advanced measurement approaches. All this amounts to an extended regulatory politics about how and when banks will gain capital reserving advantages from loss preventing investments.
Even if the data definition issue can be settled, the data collection process has important behavioural dimensions. There can be disincentives to report relevant events if they are likely to increase the capital charge to the business unit. For example, while internal agents such as in-house lawyers and human resource specialists may have no disincentive to report near misses (because they enhance their own role by doing so), operational departments may wish to hide these events, or 'translate' them into credit and market risk issues. Equally, risks and losses may be reported and overstated as part of an argument to secure more resources. At its worst, data collection methods used 'in order to limit the adverse effects of an event, may result in incentives which would increase the number of such events themselves' (Goodhart, 2001: 12) , making data collection a perverse form of 'fatal remedy' (Sieber, 1981) for banks.
The data collection problematic has further consequences for the debate about the role of insurance. Some critics argue that Basel 2 overstates the applicability of the capital cushion philosophy, when insurance and internal process controls should do the job of risk management as well (e.g., Calomiris and Herring, 2002) . They argue that insurance is part of the overall risk management process and that the focus of capital adequacy should be on residual risks after insurance. However, while there is some allowance for insurance under AMAs, supervisors are cautious for systemic risk reasons: operational risk management could be transferred to an insurance market, which it considers to be under-capitalised. In addition, one large loss on an operational risk policy could eradicate the market for cover. Although these concerns reflect the fragmentation of regulatory regimes for insurance and banking, a deeper question concerns the actuarial base for operational risk insurance given the problems of data definition and frequency discussed above (Goodhart, 2001 ). There may be no rational basis for correlating premiums and risk, and questions exist about the scope of policies and how claims might be paid. Indeed, insurance policies can have many idiosyncratic features (deductibles, limits, etc), which make them difficult to value. proprietorial assets for life insurance businesses. However, even if these approaches, which are still developing, become established, they have the effect of making an internal approach to operational risk measurement de facto external, thereby blunting the risk-sensitivity to specific organisations, which is the whole purpose of the advanced approach. So pooling of loss data is one potentially self-contradictory 'solution' path.
The other, less conscious, path follows from evidence that organisations tend to collect the data that they can, given legacy information systems, rather than the data they need. This is the point at which the tail of data collection may wag the dog of operational risk management, suggesting that organisations frame and construct notions of error and its management which fit existing institutionalised patterns of information gathering and institutionalised demands for modelling, while other significant anomalies may go unnoticed (Vaughan, 2002) . However, the operational risk management agenda has focused bank attention on medium to high probability events with low individual impact, but which in aggregate may yield significant losses. Fines for mis-selling financial products, fines imposed on some US investment banks in 2003, and credit card fraud losses have also given the operational risk management agenda a non-Barings flavour, with a strong emphasis on legal liability risk and fraud prevention.
In summary, operational risk management is far from being a simple technocratic process involving risk identification and data collection. Data collection is a constitutive and performative process, which identifies organisational categories of error, mistake and anomaly, and locates them as risks for decision-making purposes.
Data collection is also a behavioural challenge to 'buy-in' by banking staff and to the organisational capacity to use 'new' data sets to challenge prevailing cultures and norms. Operational risk management is faced with a potential puzzle. On the one hand, as an emergent managerial and supervisory category it is dramatised by the historical experience of low probability, high impact events, ie, the rogue trader paradigm. On the other hand, the material practice of operational risk management is being shaped by existing patterns of risk management working by private internal agents in relation to medium to low impact and medium to high probability events.
These agents, such as lawyers and internal auditors, define the operational risk agenda in their own terms. Organisations collect the data that these agents consider to be relevant to working practices, and construct notions of error which can be operationalized, but which may not correspond to an originally defined need. Thus, a political economy of regulation, which recognizes the power of private agents to define regulatory knowledge, must also take account of the tendency for existing organizational practices to frame, shape and 'tame' potentially unmanageable organizational dangers. A particularly significant narrative from this point of view concerns the imperative of quantitative modelling.
QUANTIFICATION AND TRUST IN OPERATIONAL RISK NUMBERS
'… operational risk measurement is not the same as operational risk management.
Quantifying those operational risks that lend themselves to quantification and neglecting the rest does not constitute best practice…' (Cagan, 2001 ).
The rise of operational risk management reveals different nuances of 'trust in numbers' (Porter, 1994 ) for management purposes. There are varied aspirations to measure in the shadow of the institutional legacy of credit risk and market risk modeling, and discourses emphasising 'robustness' are conspicuous. Some commentators refer wistfully to the 'immature' nature of risk modelling for operational risk and bemoan the fact that there is no alternative to 'semi-quantitative' methods (e.g., Wilson, 1995) . Pressures for an ideal rational economic basis for capital charging exist even when so-called softer approaches are used for practical reasons. The method of the risk adjusted rate of return on capital (RAROC), though not restricted to the operational risk debate, is instructive.
The idea behind RAROC is that profit of a unit is calculated after a charge for capital at risk (Jorion, 2001: 96) . The method therefore presupposes and requires the quantification of capital at risk, which in turn allows the performance of different units/traders to be compared in terms of a ratio of net return to risk capital. Banking industry interest in RAROC grew in part as a consequence of dissatisfaction with regulatory risk ratios. For many banks, the search for 'true economic risk', or at least better representations of risk than arbitrary regulatory adjustments, was part of the search both for improved divisional performance measurement and to conduct a continuing critique of risk insensitive regulatory practice, pressures which led in part to the adoption of in-house models in 1996 for market risk purposes.
This adversarial environment led to a wave of conferences and concept papers on RAROC in the early 1990s, culminating in the demand for a more 'rigorous' RAROC practice which 'feeds off a bank's underlying risk models and data'. 10 Yet, RAROC is more than a technical device for calculating; it represents a programme which potentially aligns regulatory objectives for safety via a capital cushion, with managerial objectives for the efficient allocation of resources and performance appraisal. RAROC therefore epitomises the enforced self-regulation ideal in which regulatory systems work with the grain of industry practice, a theoretical win-win convergence of regulatory and economic capital. However, in practice, 'if line managers can't understand the approach… RAROC can't gain acceptance across a bank,' (Jameson, 2001a) . Managers must become 'comfortable' with capital allocations based on RAROC: 'This is partly a problem of bank politics and balance:
making sure that senior managers support RAROC projects, that business lines are involved and that RAROC figures are neither rejected out of hand nor used uncritically.' (Jameson, 2001a: 5) . So, whatever the technical merits of RAROC as an integrative risk measurement technology, it is part of a complex organizational politics, one potential tool among others in pricing decisions.
While RAROC provides an ideal for decision-making and a language for risk management investments, there is also a looseness of fit with the way RAROC calculations are used and behavioural issues are as critical as technical ones: '…while it is important to get the formula right, RAROC analyses are part of a longer term battle for the hearts and minds in an institution' (Jameson, 2001a) . This idea that rational calculation must be 'sold' to practitioners is not new; studies of new accounting systems demonstrate the complex micro-politics of accounting change.
Furthermore, the implementation of RAROC-based systems changes power relations in banking organisations, just as divisional performance measurement has done more generally. RAROC is about new centres of calculation which shift power to different experts in organisations, armed with data and the authority to interpret. Indeed, Basel 2, in validating the private production of regulatory knowledge, has strengthened the hand of internal control agents in banks, who can claim a strategic role beyond that of compliance functionary.
According to the head of group risk at SEB, a Swedish bank, the internal motivation for RAROC is to produce better pricing of banking products, especially in areas where market prices do not really exist, and discipline over 'capital hungry' units. In this sense, RAROC is implicated in a critical organizational politics. Jameson (2001a) argues that practitioners accept RAROC as a general philosophy or ideal, but it is not yet realised as a 'true risk metric', and the conceptual battles are not over.
While there is pressure to iron out 'technical wrinkles, it is also accepted that it is 'difficult to build some factors, such as the long-term value of a customer relationship, into the model' and that an attractive RAROC figure is not an automatic green light to expansion of a business line. These qualifications to the RAROC project of rational calculation explain why internal discussions 'can degenerate into political skirmishes'.
To summarise: RAROC is at the heart of an ambition for 'rational' capital charging as These two contrasting styles of approach to operational risk represent competing knowledge discourses or 'logics of practice', a 'tug of war' (Hoffman, 2002:186) which is inherent in the Basel 2 proposals. A good generic example of calculative pragmatism is Simon's (1999) risk calculator technology, a tool which generates qualitative scores for the riskiness of different functional areas. The tool generates scores which 'become objective' by virtue of being used by management and by virtue of being attention-directing. The process has nothing to do with measuring risk in terms of frequencies and even little connection with a process of measuring subjective 'degrees of belief' (Gigerenzer, 2001: 26-27 ). Simon admits that 'the risk exposure calculator is not a precise tool…' and its results are 'directional' only (Simon, 1999: 86) .
Calculative pragmatism of this kind, commonly referred to as 'soft' risk management, makes sense in environments where it is critical to identify and catalogue risks which lie at the limits of formal knowledge, hence its importance in the emergence of operational risk management. Scoring systems which emerge from consultative, focus group processes make risk identification and mapping a semi-expert practice which presupposes a 'knowledge and wisdom base in all organisations that can provide powerful feedback for the purposes of mapping risks' (Cagan, 2001 ). For example, Bankers Trust, identified as a 'pioneer in risk management' (Jorion, 2001: 96) , allocated capital to operational risk based on scoring for a range of factors including inherent risk, control risk and actual loss experience (Hoffman, 2002; Wilson, 1995) . Chase Manhatten bank in 1999 adapted the COSO (1991) framework for its operational risk processes (Barton et al., 2001 : chapter 3) and in another experiment, the chief risk officer at ANZ bank, Mark Lawrence, also used a scorecard system, claiming it was a forward-looking and rational basis for allocating economic capital to business units (Jameson, 2001b the quantification of operational risk is just one tool for controlling it (Cagan, 2001 ).
Indeed, 'given the difficulty of quantifying aspects of operational risk, the reliance on a single number may itself be an operational risk' (Wilson, 2001) . 11 From the pragmatists' point of view, operational risk management is constructed as the management of risk management, a higher order governance function standing in a hierarchical relation to the calculative idealism of market and credit risk management functions. Accordingly, the realization of operational risk management embodies tensions between different constellations of quantitative expertise in organisations and becomes a stake in the competition for pre-eminence in management hierarchies.
Basel 2 embodies an explicit philosophy of relying on 'solid management processes' (Pillar 2) seeking to activate senior management responsibility for the self-assessment of risk, ie, the 'management of risk management', a feature which plays to the pragmatists' emphasis. However, both pragmatists and idealists share a distrust of supervisor discretion, either through judgements about the quality of internal controls in the second pillar, or in supervisory diktat to modify banks' own calculations of economic capital.
To summarise: practitioner debates about operational risk refer extensively to issues of quantification, but not in a consistent manner. Calculative idealism regards managing operational risk as no different in principle from market risk or credit risk, and assumes it is a monster to be ultimately tamed within these frameworks.
Calculative pragmatism accepts much of the idealists' need to model where this is possible, but places greater emphasis on management processes and internal controls as the key foundation of operational risk management. Although these ideal types rarely appear in pure form, their differences continue to surface in policy discussions about Basel 2 and in variations in the approaches adopted by particular banks. The tension between calculative pragmatism and idealism also reflects a disciplinary collision between auditing and finance, the one a humble and pragmatic craft, despite a history of scientific pretensions, and the other drawing upon advanced mathematical techniques to model 'market' and 'credit' risks. 12 Operational risk embodies important differences within notions of economic calculation. These differences correspond to new occupational mobility projects, in turn made possible by the 'enforced self regulatory' ideal of Basel 2 which explicitly enlists private actors to generate knowledge and utilizes private organizations' capacities for self-control.
CONCLUSIONS
The Basel 2 banking regulation reforms have successfully institutionalised the category of operational risk as a site of regulatory knowledge production. The concept is neither a discrete category, nor a set of well-defined practices but creates a new boundary object within a 'constellation' (Burchell et al, 1985) of private interests, and in which multiple existing elements of risk management practice are combined to create a hybrid regulatory and managerial practice: operational risk management. New organisational experts and power relations are visible in the discourse of operational risk; loose associations of practitioners are reinventing themselves in its name and there is a promise of a higher order discipline for the humbler end of risk management.
The power of the operational risk category lies in its capacity to unite apparently disparate concerns with fraud, processing error, business discontinuity, human resource management, legal liability as well as with reputational and strategic risk management. It defines a space of attention where the capital charging framework overlaps with, and corresponds to, corporate governance issues, especially where the latter are increasingly framed in terms of organizational process. Indeed, the rise of operational risk provides an instructive normative case study for policy-makers; given the necessity of relying on private knowledge production, regulators should actively seek to create constellations of interest via concepts with wide appeal: concepts themselves can be powerful technologies of change.
The story of operational risk is still unfolding and this essay has sought to identify three key areas or fronts where the management and regulation of operational risk has been contested. These definitional struggles, data collection paradoxes and competing calculative ideologies are embedded in an intra-organisational politics, in which competition for buy-in, for the allocation of responsibility and for professional status are strategic stakes for internal agents, such as risk officers. The category of operational risk may remain contested, but has also invented new visibilities within risk management and new possibilities for intervention and control in the name of risk.
Basel 2 reflects a general climate of regulatory attention to organisational internal control systems and cultures of control. This climate in turn mirrors a political economy of regulation in which regulated entities and hybrid coalitions of private experts are explicitly enlisted as partners in processes of ordering and regulatory knowledge production. However, multiple and competing private discourses of control may compete with one another and the ability to sponsor and determine regulatory knowledge in complex areas, such as operational risk, will correlate with power.
Finally, Basel 2 is a global mega-regulatory programme on the grandest of scales, projecting an ideal, a fantasy perhaps (Clarke, 1999) of hyper-rational management for the world banking system. The invention and mobilisation of new concepts like operational risk, reflects broader political demands for effective regulation and for images of rational control and oversight to underwrite confidence and security in the financial system. From this point of view there is more than a slight suspicion that the invention of operational risk is an attempt to frame the unframeable, to assuage our deepest anxieties and fears about uncontrollable 'rogue others', and to tame monsters which have been created and nurtured by the financial system itself.
6 Indicative evidence for this is provided by a non-systematic sample of ten major banks' annual reports in Australia, France, Germany, UK and USA. These reports show the first mention of operational risk as a narrative disclosure category from 1998 onwards, with only two mentioning the concept prior to this. For a more systematic treatement, see Helbok and Wagner (2003) .
7 QIS3 has dual objectives: first to ensure that total capital in the banking system remains stable ('broadly neutral') under the new regime; second to monitor the incentive for banks to use the more advanced approaches, i.e., whether a lower charge is forthcoming at the individual bank level. Given the apparently contradictory nature of these objectives, it is worth considering whether: 'the new emphasis on operational risk is partly just a smokescreen for a cumulative add-on factor, to offset the reduction that would otherwise occur from the move towards more sophisticated measurement of the other kinds of risk.' (Goodhart, 2001: 14) . In addition to QIS3, there was also an Operational Risk Loss Gathering exercise.
